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The scope and scale of problems in the quality of health
service provision have been increasingly recognised in
recent years. Policy and planning for financing are
usually concerned with how funding is made available
and allocated, rather than with what is being achieved,
including the quality of health services delivered. A
fundamental challenge is how to improve the delivery of
health services to achieve improved patient outcomes
and to optimize financial outcomes. To accomplish this
it is essential that the debates on quality of care and
financing are aligned. Approaches to improving the
quality of care are drawn from Australia, the US, and
the UK. Financing arrangments for care at a national
level have a bearing on how payment incentives can be
used to promote or impede quality. The level of overall
expenditure is obviously important, as are the
mechanisms for payment. Long term programs to build
knowledge, standardise processes, provide credible
performance data and foster accountability are required
to ensure that further investments lead to improvement in
care.
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The sustainable financing and quality of careagendas share the same principal objective ofmaximising the benefit for the resources
expended in a predictable and sustainable mode.
Yet the nature of the debate is different.
Traditionally, the financing debate has focused
on issues of “how” revenue and expenditure are
managed, with particular attention to affordabil-
ity and efficiency. The fundamental need is to
ensure that overall levels of expenditure on health
are sufficient to provide the infrastructure neces-
sary for health services—such as medicines,
equipment, facilities and providers—to the entire
eligible population. However, once this threshold
is achieved, the mechanisms through which pay-
ments for specific services are made can be an
important determinant of how and what type of
care is provided. Yet these payment mechanisms
are rarely specifically designed to achieve explicit
clinical care or patient outcome objectives.
The quality debate is primarily about “what”
processes should be used and what outcomes
should be achieved or, in financial terms, how to
maximise return on investment. This necessitates
the development of a clinical evidence base and
adherence of practice to what is known or
believed to be appropriate and effective care.
There are a number of reasons for exploring the
relationship between quality improvement and
sustainable financing. In particular, studies of
future trends in health care indicate that the pro-
vision of care will become more complex and the
demands on the system will increase over time.
This means that the best use of existing and new
resources must be assured.
Poor quality care generates unnecessary costs
through the underuse, overuse, and misuse of
interventions and services. Moreover, quality
improvements will not automatically flow either
from the good intentions or training of healthcare
professionals. Good quality outcomes are increas-
ingly related to how processes for ongoing quality
improvement are built into systems design.1
This paper brings together the “what” and the
“how” of the health financing debate to explore
how they can be aligned to improve value. It
defines quality in health care and presents data
on the scope, breadth and cost of quality of care
problems in the UK, USA and Australia, with brief
summaries of current national strategies. Aspects
of the debates about health financing are drawn
together with reference to how they may impact
on quality. Finally, a parallel process of invest-
ment with reform programmes is suggested.
DEFINING AND DESCRIBING QUALITY IN
HEALTH CARE
The term “quality” is used in this paper in the
sense defined by the Institute of Medicine: “the
degree to which health services for individuals and
populations increase the likelihood of desired health out-
comes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge.”2 Quality is therefore both a relative
and an empirically based term, involving ele-
ments of judgement in its assessment and uncer-
tainties both in knowledge and practice.
Efforts to improve and monitor performance
have led to the identification of a number of
domains of quality. Within national (Australia,
US, UK, Canada, and New Zealand) and inter-
national (WHO and OECD) initiatives, consensus
is emerging that quality involves the following
domains: safety, effectiveness, appropriateness,
responsiveness/patient centred care, equity/
access, and efficiency.3 Other attributes of any
healthcare system such as overall capacity and
technological capability also affect these out-
comes. Quality of care efforts must focus at both
the macro (population) and micro (individual)
levels. While the ultimate test of healthcare
systems may be their impact on health outcomes
at the population level, many population level
health outcomes are more susceptible to non-
medical factors such as sanitation, education and
housing than to the influence of healthcare
services.4
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Historically, quality in health care has been an implicit
judgement at the level of patient-physician contact. Quality
has been largely addressed through professional registration,
review of professional appointments, and less formal peer
review processes. Over the last two decades this has changed
dramatically, with increasing recognition that quality im-
provement cannot be seen just as a byproduct of other
processes.
Problems with timely access to treatments—for example, in
the UK—and the equitable distribution of care—for example,
in the US—are well documented, although they are distrib-
uted differently across countries. Access and equity are critical
to quality, as well as safety, effectiveness, and appropriateness
which are the focus of this paper.
SCOPE AND SCALE OF PROBLEMS WITH QUALITY
Stakeholder perceptions of quality
Numerous surveys, both in individual countries and compari-
sons between countries, portray the formidable scale and
scope of performance issues. Whether through the eyes of
physicians, patients or purchasers/payers, concerns regarding
eroding performance are widespread. In a survey conducted in
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the UK, and the US,
physicians reported a significant decline in their ability to
deliver high quality care in all five countries.5 When asked how
their ability to provide quality care had changed over the past
5 years, a significant number of physicians reported that it was
worse (Australia 38%, Canada 59%, New Zealand 53%, UK
46%, US 57%). Only one quarter or less of the physicians in
any country reported that their ability to provide high quality
care had improved over the past 5 years. This finding is
supported in another recent survey in which 17–44% of nurses
in five countries (Canada, Germany, Scotland, England and
the US) reported that quality had deteriorated in the past
year.5
Although it is tempting to discount these findings as com-
plaints by disgruntled clinicians, we also need to look at pub-
lic perceptions of the performance of health systems. In a sur-
vey of attitudes of both the public and physicians in Australia,
UK, USA, Canada, and New Zealand performed in 1998, the
public indicated overwhelmingly that the health system in
their country required fundamental change or a complete
overhaul.5 In fact, the level of dissatisfaction was dramatically
revealed in a 1998 American Consumer Satisfaction Index
which placed hospitals between the US Postal Office and the
Internal Revenue Service.6 This sobering assessment clearly
indicates a mistrust of the American public in health care
institutions and provides one more dramatic data point to
illustrate the pressing need to address performance issues.
Safety and medical error
The US, UK and Australia have each recently experienced
growing concerns about medical errors and a heightened
emphasis on safety and quality. In the US the Institute of
Medicine Report “To Err is Human” estimated the incidence of
mortality relating to medical error to be 44 000–98 000 per
year.7 In Australia the Quality in Australian Health Care Study
reported on a study of over 14 000 medical records which
found that 16.6% of hospital admissions were associated with
an adverse event.8 In the UK recent failures in medical care—
Bristol and Newham—have reinforced a growing public anxi-
ety regarding the safety of medical care which has resulted in
a number of new initiatives outlined in the Chief Medical
Officer’s publication “An Organisation with a Memory”.9
This area of safety illustrates the inherent mutuality of
interest between the quality and financing agendas. Extrapo-
lating the US and Australian experience to the UK, the more
conservative (American) findings suggested that over 300 000
adverse events per annum are associated with a cost of over £1
billion. Recently, the National Audit Office in England
reported that the outstanding claims for alleged clinical negli-
gence in NHS hospitals totalled £3.9 billion ($US5.6 billion).
Medical error, or safety deficiencies, constitutes a major risk
for the sustainability of financing.
Effectiveness and appropriateness
In the USA, studies published in leading professional journals
consistently report that people with acute and chronic medical
conditions receive only about two thirds of the health care
needed and, at the same time, that 20–30% of interventions
are either unnecessary or of questionable benefit.10 Significant
variations in the use of specific healthcare interventions have
long been observed and raise questions about the effectiveness
of care for common conditions. Some treatments continue to
be used despite strong evidence that they may be ineffective or
even harmful—for example, the use of antibiotics for upper
respiratory infections or enforced bed rest in pregnancy.11
Numerous interventions known to be effective are
underused—for example, β blockers to prevent recurrent
heart attacks and warfarin for atrial fibrillation.
IDENTIFYING STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS THE
PROBLEMS
As dramatic as these quality problems are collectively, projec-
tions indicate that they are likely to grow. The pressures on the
healthcare system are likely to increase with the growth in the
aging population, increasing public expectations, and continu-
ing gaps between demand and capacity.12 A sluggish response
on the part of the health services sector is predictable because
of the conservative nature of workforce development
strategies and the inertia of large complex and hierarchical
institutions (such as hospitals). The complexity and scale of
the health services sector will inevitably exacerbate the
challenges further.13
There are two major categories of problems in quality—
those at the systemic level and those at the individual provider
level. Attempting to address problems at either level alone will
not be successful. Multiple strategies for remediation must be
employed to ameliorate performance deficiencies. Three key
strategies are:
• improving processes and standardisation at the system
level;
• knowledge enhancement at the individual provider level;
and
• patient engagement.
Improving processes and standardisation at the system
level
To identify appropriate ways of improving performance in the
healthcare sector it is useful to consider other “high risk, high
reliability” business sectors such as military operations,
mining, space travel, and aviation. Each of these has moved
towards higher performance in terms of safety. Amalberti has
identified a “migration path” for improvement that requires
the articulation of knowledge about what works, the
standardisation of procedures, and the improvement of
human and organisational factors.14 15 Figure 1 illustrates this
migration path, drawing on an analysis of concepts derived
from error reduction strategies in aviation.
Over a period of time, systems need to move through an
initial phase of developing knowledge about what works and
what does not, which Amalberti refers to as the “heroic time”.
During this phase many errors and injuries occur. The next
phase, referred to as the “business and technical time”,
involves standardisation of processes. This occurs through
changes in many performance shaping factors. This is the
point at which most of the gains are made in safety improve-
ment. To achieve the greatest safety levels the system has to be
designed to correct human error and organisational problems.
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Despite the differences between the aviation and health
sectors, a comparison of the approaches has been useful in
showing that the problems in health care are also largely
systemic—that is, many of the failures relate to the organisa-
tional features of care rather than the acts of individual carers
failing in their duties. These flaws can be “designed out” of the
system of care, but this represents quite new thinking in
health—substantially moving the focus of attention away
from the individual clinician’s behaviour towards environ-
mental issues, equipment deficiencies, and the functioning of
the clinical teams. As discussed in more detail below, funding
and payment issues are a major factor in addressing system
level performance.
Knowledge enhancement at the individual provider
level
Knowledge deficiencies may be best understood as simply
deriving from an inability to master new knowledge at the rate
and complexity it is being produced. Even well intentioned
and highly motivated clinicians have to grapple with the vol-
ume of evidence that is constantly becoming available. In
three decades (mid 1960s to mid 1990s) the number of
randomised clinical trials published increased from 100 to
10 000 articles annually. In the past 5 years alone, nearly half
(49%) of all the extant medical literature has been
published.16 This knowledge gap results in a knowledge lag—
that is, the time lapse between identification of more
efficacious treatments and their incorporation into routine
practice. This time lag has been estimated to be in the range of
15–20 years, and even then the adoption of evidence into
practice is very uneven.17 The challenge of translating research
into practice is not only manifest in complicated clinical con-
ditions or the use of emerging technologies and pharmaceuti-
cals, but also in the most routine medical problems such as the
common cold, for which physicians prescribe antibiotics in
40–60% of outpatient visits even though there is no evidence
that antibiotics are effective.18–20
In terms of the degree of uncertainty about what works,
there are many healthcare procedures and tests that have
marginal or no proven benefit.21 Even when an intervention is
proved by randomised controlled trials to be effective, the
skills of the provider may lead to a significantly poorer
outcome for patients.22
How do these knowledge and proficiency gaps affect
sustainable financing? The cost implications are huge—one
example is the use of cardiac invasive procedures. In the US,
researchers from RAND found that, in one state, 50% of
coronary angiographies were performed so incompetently as
to render them inaccurate for diagnostic interpretation. If
extrapolated to all 1.3 million angiographies performed in the
US in 1998, the 50% error rate would cost approximately US$8
billion.23
A serious challenge exists to rectify this problem of knowl-
edge deficiency, particularly when understood as a continuous
need for facilitating rapid uptake of published evidence into
daily patient care. There are a number of processes necessary
to synthesise and assess the available evidence and to
translate this evidence into practice. Figure 2 shows some of
these steps.
Applying evidence of effectiveness to standardise practice
Processes of performance review and public reporting are
important strategies to increase evidence-based medicine and
achieve more standardised practice (fig 2). Performance indi-
cators embedded in guidelines and protocols at a level under-
standable and actionable by clinicians are widely used to
facilitate translation of evidence into routine practice.
Physicians can more easily digest performance measures as
they are often produced in a simple format defining critical
process or outcome measures. However, there are significant
challenges in the use of performance indicators to guide prac-
tice, and the acceptance of protocols and guidelines by physi-
cians is likely to differ from country to country.
The development of clinical guidelines and protocols is a
necessary but not sufficient condition. Published research to
date has not shown that the use of clinical guidelines and pro-
tocols alone has been effective in changing physician
behaviour.10 24–27 In the UK a recent BMA survey of more than
100 doctors found that 70% did not believe that the newly
established national body (National Institute for Clinical Evi-
dence) which is developing the evidence basis for guidelines
and protocols is acting independently. Furthermore, 75% said
they disagreed with at least one of the newly developed deci-
sions and 85% said that they would ignore the Institute’s
guidance if they thought it was wrong.28
More broadly, the literature documents few systematic
improvements using only data feedback by hospital or medical
groups. Although there are some notable exceptions, most
have had rather modest improvements, arguing that addi-
tional interventions should be used in a complementary way
to modify provider behaviour.29 The importance of payment
design once again argues for the need of aligning the financ-
ing and quality agendas.
Engaging patients and consumers
During the past 2–3 years improving patients’ experience of
health care has become a higher and more visible priority
across North America, Australia, and Europe. Quality from a
patient’s point of view relates not only to outcomes but also to
humane respectful treatment, convenience, and timely access.
Yet physicians often believe that quality should be based more
on what is done to patients than what happened to them and
how it happened.21
There are two applications of performance indicators at the
level of the individual citizen: (1) as a potential consumer of
services and (2) as a patient. In the first there are increasing
efforts by governments to define the healthcare system as a
public service with the citizen as a consumer having rights and
responsibilities. In the UK this has taken the form of
articulating the modernisation programmes for the “new
NHS” using language of “a health service designed around the
patient”. Newly committed resources and initiatives to
promote citizen and patient empowerment include making
information more readily available by free telephone calls to
nurses and an electronic medical library providing access for
the consumer to medical information shared with the clinical
professionals.30 Programmes to empower patients are not just
politically correct, they can be effective at rationalising
resources. There is now a body of literature documenting the
salutary effects of giving information to patients who have
better outcomes, choose less risky procedures, and avoid
equivocal treatments.30

























However, evidence to date would suggest that, on their own,
formalised approaches to continuous quality improvement
including patient engagement have not had an impact on
healthcare processes commensurate with their impact on
critical processes in other industries.31 The effective transfer of
concepts of quality improvement from broader industry to
health care is not straightforward and knowledge of how to
use such tools most effectively to improve quality within
health care is still limited.
CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE
ACTION
Table 1 presents some of the challenges and strategies for
effective action to move towards a safe and high quality
healthcare sector, including payment mechanisms. Notwith-
standing the many challenges, focusing on organisations and
systems of care has the obvious appeal of pragmatism given
the daunting challenges of dealing with every individual pro-
vider directly. In addition, there is evidence that organisation/
systems of providers use data to change care processes,
improve responsiveness to patient feedback, and act to amel-
iorate circumstances associated with the occurrence of
adverse events.32 But the outcomes are patchy across the
system. Leatherman and Sutherland33 commented that, in the
UK, the knowledge generated from quality improvement
activities at the organisational level has been important but
has not led to predictable systemic change. It is also
increasingly apparent that investments in quality information
systems are necessary to effect and sustain change success-
fully at either the system or individual level.34 These factors
argue for the implementation of a broad strategy using multi-
ple methods of quality improvement.
HOW DO FINANCING STRUCTURES IMPACT ON
QUALITY?
We have explored the nature of quality problems and some of
the most commonly used approaches to improve care.
Improvement strategies must also include the intentional
design of payment mechanisms and use of financial incen-
tives. A discussion of issues related payment and incentives
must first consider current financing systems, their structure
and funding levels. Four major aspects will be discussed here:
• the overall level of resourcing available;
• the structure of health financing (the way funds are raised
and disbursed);
• the major payment mechanisms; and
• the specific use of incentives.
Structure and levels of financing
The fundamental differences in organisation and financing in
Australia, the UK, and USA provide a unique opportunity to
analyse different approaches to performance improvement. At
one end of the continuum is the UK which has a nationalised,
centrally driven healthcare system. The UK has had a lower
spending rate on health than most other OECD countries, but
the UK government has recently initiated a bold set of reforms
linking performance goals with a variety of financing and
governance incentives. In sharp contrast to the monolithic
structure of the NHS in the UK, US health care is a concatena-
tion of healthcare systems with variable insurance benefits,
influenced by differing regulation at a combination of state
and federal levels. It is a pluralistic private sector dominated
health system with a market based approach where price
competition has often driven selection and choice, although
quality indicators are increasingly used by healthcare purchas-
ers and consumers to catalyse performance improvement.
Australia stands between these two approaches and repre-
sents a unique blend of features seen in the US and UK. It has
an established universal access system, complemented by the
use of market like financing incentives and stimulation of the
private sector. This has accelerated over recent years. About
31% of health expenditure is private spending. The key
features of the healthcare financing systems in these three
countries are summarised in table 2.
As shown in table 2, there are significant differences
between the countries in the level of health expenditure as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). One of the
strongest predictors of the proportion of GDP spent on health
care by western nations is the size of the GDP itself.35 This,
together with pharmaceuticals and technology which are the
known strongest drivers of spending, indicate that increased
spending on health care is inevitable in western nations.
Clearly, spending below a threshold level of GDP will result in
suboptimal care as the capacity for patients to access drugs
and medical care will be severely constrained. However, it is
also clear that many OECD countries have reached a plateau
where it is difficult to demonstrate any great improvements in
care in relation to greater investment. The US already spends
more on health as a percentage of GDP than any other nation
but there is no conclusive evidence that health outcomes or
services are better.36
Payment mechanisms and incentives
It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment on the macro
issues related to how funds are raised and disbursed. Payment
mechanisms have been linked more directly to quality of care.



















































Broader financial and incentive environment
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Over the last three decades there have been many efforts to
influence practice in all three countries by the use of purchas-
ing or contracting incentives and different forms of payment
and reimbursement. These involve paying for the number of
people registered for care by particular practitioners (capita-
tion); capped or global budgets for hospitals or healthcare
networks; payments targeted at particular outcomes (incen-
tives payments); fee-for-service or per episode of care. These
have mainly focused on increasing throughput (for example,
increased numbers of admissions in the UK), improving pro-
ductivity (for example, decreased average lengths of stay in
hospitals), and rewarding appropriateness (for example,
increasing preventive care and reducing unnecessary care).
Pay for performance is a concept of growing interest in both
publicly financed and private payment healthcare systems. Evi-
dence indicates that payment policies can strongly influence
how both the institutional provider (hospitals, health systems)
and individual providers (physicians and healthcare profession-
als) provide health services.37 Designing and implementing
funding mechanisms to reduce suboptimisation in care is
therefore vital. There is some evidence to indicate that certain
payment mechanisms are associated with particular practices—
for example, capitation with providing fewer services and
fee-for-service in encouraging the provision of more services;
however, only very limited research is available on the use of
payment for objectively measured performance.
Paying for results or rewarding high quality of care is not a
new concept. It has been applied in various countries to
promote preventive services such as immunisation. For years
GPs in the NHS have been paid additionally for reaching tar-
get rates of immunisations. In Australia incentives have
included cash to parents and doctors to encourage immunisa-
tions, and in the US various experiments have been made with
payment mechanisms to reward reduction of unnecessary
procedures while reinforcing primary prevention. It is
prudent, however, that financing incentives be used only when
there is strong evidence of effectiveness and specific outcomes
Table 1 Attributes of a sector to provide high quality health care
Challenges Strategies
Enhancing knowledge
• Rigorous evidence in limited specific areas • Research driven more by questions of improved outcomes for patients
• Systematic assessment of learning what works in practice • Techniques to appraise, organise and make accessible available evidence
• Integrated patient perspective • Capacity to pool and monitor local data including patient views in areas
that require intervention
• Point of care computers that support rapid access to patient data, tests
and evidence
Standardising processes (consistent application of practices known to be effective)
• Differences in service configurations at local level • Development of standards and protocols based on evidence where
possible
• Uneven resourcing at local level • Decision support systems widely distributed at clinical encounter level
• Predominance of apprenticeship learning • Training and education that recognises practical barriers to
implementation
• Tensions between professional autonomy and public accountability • Performance review at a local level by the multidisciplinary teams and by
professional peers
• Personal incentives, both professional and financial (including the removal
of disincentives)
• Public reporting with adequate interpretation of issues
• Automated communication processes
Increasing effectiveness and predictability of performance at system level
• Infinite demand • Clear operating values that appropriately balance capacity with the
objectives of effectiveness, efficiency and equity
• Hierarchical and feudal relationships • Capacity for shared performance review
• Low level of investment in work process design and review • Incentives that foster adoption of best practices and remove barriers of
blame, cost and lack of resources
• Long term funding stability that allows local level sustainable investment in
service redesign
Table 2 Comparison of features of the health financing systems of the USA, UK and Australia35
Features of health financing USA Australia UK
% GDP on health expenditure 12.9% 8.6% 6.8%
% public v private 44.8% 70% 83%
Insurance payment mechanisms Employer related insurance Private insurance with tax rebates;
universal tax payments
Universal tax based insurance
scheme
Hospitals/networks payment mechanisms Volume related payments Global budget and some volume
related
Global budgets through areas
with performance pay





Through private insurance: fee for
service or sessional with incentives
National fee for service with some
practice related payments
Capitation and practice payments
with incentives
Nurses and allied health payment
mechanisms
Through insurance cover mainly
with safety net
Through public hospitals and specific
programs; otherwise private payments
Through public hospitals and GPs
% Total health expenditure on
pharmaceuticals
10.1% 11.4% 16.3%





can be articulated. This will limit their application to targeted
areas of quality improvement.
A second major task for the rational design and implemen-
tation of incentives is removal of financial barriers to improv-
ing care. The judicious use of financial incentives requires
careful design in two ways: (1) reinforcing positive perform-
ance through additional payments, and (2) removing payment
mechanisms that perversely affect desired performance. For
example, if a performance target is identified for the reduction
of unnecessary hysterectomies, the payment methods must, at
minimum, eliminate the financial barrier to performance that
results in a loss of income for those hospitals most successful
at achieving the target. In the case of reducing unnecessary
procedures, a fee-for-service hospital funding method results
in a reward to the payer rather than to the unit responsible for
the performance objective—that is, the hospital—which
incurs a loss of income.
Financial incentives may be reinforced by non-financial
rewards. A new incentive system being implemented in the
UK will reward high performers with greater institutional
autonomy, including financial management, while the lower
performers will be required to demonstrate intent to change
and be subjected to more external vigilance. Judgements of
performance will be based on the explicit performance indica-
tors developed as part of a major national initiative called the
National Performance Framework, as well as being overseen
by an independent external review body (the Commission for
Health Improvement).38
SUMMARY: THE IMPERATIVE TO JOIN UP THE
FINANCING AND QUALITY AGENDAS
The healthcare systems in the countries described here face
similar dilemmas: rising patient expectations, growing evidence
of quality of care problems, pressures for increased spending (as
a percentage of GDP), constant enhancements to technological
capacity, and disparities in ethnic, race and sex groupings.
Being a service sector, the capacity to manage these
pressures is determined by those who provide these services
and those who provide funding. Harm is occurring to patients
at unacceptable levels, yet there is little dialogue about how
reducing patient harm and increasing the effectiveness and
value of services can contribute to managing these financial
pressures. This is partly because of the lack of clarity about
the critical attributes of a high quality, safe healthcare
system. Even where it is recognised that more funding is
needed, the development of financing mechanisms has not
focused greatly on improving effectiveness, partly because of
its complexity.
There are significant challenges in the use of financial
incentives to improve care predictably. Firstly, the state of the
art is embryonic—that is, there is an insufficient evidence base
for understanding what works, under what circumstances,
and with what intended and unintended consequences.
Secondly, the costs—both direct and indirect—are daunting,
particularly in developing the necessary information infra-
structure which is deficient in many countries, particularly in
the area of informatics competencies. Thirdly, the complexity
of the healthcare sector and the multiplicity of “audiences and
actors” means that there are likely to be both intended and
unintended consequences of any approach.
Recognising the inherent limitations of any one method or
strategy implies the need to use a blend of approaches with
complementary effects. The use of financial incentives as an
intervention requires the concurrent use of performance indi-
cators to create intentional change in healthcare systems and
to minimise the inevitable occurrence of untoward conse-
quences. Governments will need to consider providing
resources not only for the collection and analysis of data, but
also for the extensive investment in process redesign and
workforce training development.
Discussions of funding levels will be ubiquitous and
incessant. However, this commentary would suggest that it is
critically important to focus on systems of funding and
payment that can provide the capacity and motivation to
improve performance in real time, while adapting financing
strategies to meet the changing demands on the health sector in
the long term.
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